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DETERMINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF
SECTION 2113(b) OF THE FEDERAL
BANK ROBBERY ACT

INTRODUCTION

In 1937 Congress expanded the coverage of the Federal Bank Robbery Act' (Act), making it a federal offense to "take and carry away,
with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money" from a bank
that is a member of the Federal Reserve System, or that is organized
or operating under the laws of the United States. 2 As originally enacted in 1934, 3 the Act, pursuant to a congressional desire to combat
interstate gangsterism, only made bank robbery, 4 a crime traditionally within the jurisdiction of the states, a federal offense.5
Courts have disagreed as to what types of thefts are encompassed by
the 1937 amendment. 6 Read narrowly, it applies only to trespassory
1. Federal Bank Robbery Act, ch. 304, 48 Stat. 783 (1934) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976)).
2. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 747, § 2(a), 50 Stat. 749. Section 2113(b) provides
in full:
(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any
property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to,
or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank,
credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; or
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any
property or money or any other thing of value not exceeding $100 belonging
to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank,
credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1976).
3. Federal Bank Robbery Act, ch. 304, 48 Stat. 783 (1934) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976)).
4. Id. "Whoever, by force and violence, or by putting in fear, feloniously takes,
or feloniously attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property
or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control,
management, or possession of, any bank.., shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both." Id. § 2(a).
5. S. Rep. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
6. The majority of courts of appeals supports a broad construction of § 2113(b)
to include non-trespassory thefts other than common-law larceny. See United States
v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 382-83 (10th Cir. 1982) (taking by false pretenses), petition
for cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547,
548-49 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane) (same), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Nov.
29, 1982) (No. 82-5119); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1049 (3d Cir.
1982) (check-forging scheme), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United
States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982); United States v. Khamis, 674 F.2d 390, 394
(5th Cir. 1982) (worthless check); United States v. Guiffre, 576 F.2d 126, 128 (7th
Cir.) (use of stolen and forged checks), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); United
States v. Fistel, 460 F.2d 157, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1972) (embezzlement); United States v.
Ferraro, 414 F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 1969) (receipt of embezzled money); Williams
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takings that were considered larceny at common law,7 whereby the
owner is deprived of possession of but not title to property. 8 A broad
v. United States, 402 F.2d 258, 259 (5th Cir. 1968) (taking by false pretenses), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 736-38 (5th
Cir. 1965) (same), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); cf. United States v. Tavoularis,
515 F.2d 1070, 1074 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975) (violation of § 2113(c) does not require that
taking under § 2113(b) be larcenous); United States v. Barnes, 213 F. Supp. 510, 514
(E.D. Pa. 1963) (indictment under § 2113(c) upheld even though separate indictment
alleged money embezzled in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656 and not § 2113(b)).
A minority of jurisdictions have construed the section narrowly, limiting it to the
trespassory takings of common-law larceny. See United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d
853, 854 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 711
(6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 816 (1981); Bennett v. United States, 399 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1968);
LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 7576 (3d Cir. 1941) (construing predecessor to § 2113(b), 12 U.S.C. § 588b); United
States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 310
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); United States v. Rollins, 383 F. Supp.
494, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); United States v. Starr, 48 F. Supp. 910, 911 (S.D.
Fla. 1943) (construing predecessor to § 2113(b), 12 U.S.C. § 588b); United States v.
Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596, 597 (N.D. Ind. 1940) (same). In Patton and Pinto, the
Third Circuit adopted a narrow construction of § 2113(b). More recently, however,
the court in Simmons held that the section was to be given a broad construction. 679
F.2d at 1048-49. The Third Circuit did not refer to its prior decision in Patton,
although it distinguished Pinto as limited to its particular facts. Id. at 1049. A
concurring opinion vigorously called for an express statement that the majority had
in fact overruled Pinto. Id. at 1051 (Adams, J., concurring). Notwithstanding the
majority's refusal to expressly overrule Pinto, Simmons places the continued viability
of Patton and Pinto in question.
In Rollins, the defendant was charged with violations of § 2113(a) and the federal
mail fraud statutes. The government relied on the Second Circuit's broad interpretation of § 2113(b) in Fistel as a predicate for its charge under § 2113(a). 383 F. Supp.
at 495. The district court, however, dismissed the § 2113(a) charge, finding that the
legislative history of the 1937 amendment created a clear exception to the broad
construction of § 2113(b) in Fistel, when the intended taking is fraudulent, "whether
by the use of the mails or otherwise." Id. at 496. Although the district court rejected
the analysis of the Second Circuit, the broad interpretation in Fistel was followed by
the Second Circuit, after the Rollins decision, in Tavoularis.
It should be noted that both the 1943 district court decision in Starr and the 1940
district court decision in Mangus may no longer be good law, at least in their
respective circuits, in light of the more recent broad interpretations of § 2113(b) by
the Fifth Circuit in Bell, Khamis, Ferraro,Williams and Thaggard, and the Seventh
Circuit in Guiffre. See generally Memorandum for the United States, United States
v. Bell, cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 82-5119) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. This Memorandum, filed in November 1982 by the
Solicitor General in response to petitioner Bell's petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, does not oppose the grant of the petition
because of the multi-circuit conflict on the issue. Rather, it presents both sides of the
issue of whether § 2113(b) should be limited to common-law larceny.
7. See supra note 6.
8. The elements of larceny at common-law included 1) a trespassory taking and
carrying away of the personal property of another, see United States v. Rogers, 289
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F.2d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145, 1150-51
(D. Md. 1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837
(1977); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *229, 2) with intent to permanently deprive
the owner of his rights. United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145, 1150-51 (D. Md.
1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); see 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *232. The trespassory nature of the taking is preserved
only if the thief, without the owner's consent, obtains possession of the goods but not
title. See Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 254-55, 109 N.W. 1037, 1041 (1906) (no
trespass because owner partially induced defendant's taking); W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Handbook on Criminal Law § 84, at 618; id. § 85, at 622 (1972); J.Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law § 111, at 348-51 (1934).
Several other situations were considered larceny at common law even though the
owner voluntarily relinquished possession. The theory was that the person in actual
possession who misappropriated the property committed a trespass against the owner's "constructive possession." Two such situations are larceny by bailee, People v.
McDonald, 43 N.Y. 61 (1870), and the delivery of property by the owner for a special
purpose or as part of a transaction, in which the receiver of the property absconds
with it. Hildebrand v. People, 56 N.Y. 394 (1874). A third situation is larceny by
trick, whereby the thief, with intent to fraudulently convert property, induces the
owner by lies to give up possession but not title. See J. Miller, supra, § 112, at 35761. A classic example is The King v. Pear, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (1779), in which the
defendant hired a horse by telling the owner that he was going to Sutton, while in
fact he intended to go elsewhere and sell the horse. Id. at 208-09. The defendant
obtained possession but not title; the owner, however, was deemed to have retained
"possession" until the defendant sold the horse, thereby preserving the "trespass"
necessary to convict the defendant of larceny. See id. at 209; W. LaFave & A. Scott,
supra, § 85, at 627. The lies sufficient for larceny by trick may be written or spoken,
and they may be misrepresentations of present or past facts or false promises. Id. A
fourth situation is larceny by unilateral mistake of the owner/possessor. The property
of A may be delivered to B by a mistake as to a) the nature of the property, id. at 629;
see Sapp v. State, 157 Fla. 605, 26 So. 2d 646 (1946) (en bane) (bank cashier confused
amount of check with paid-to-date total); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 123,
60 S.W. 938 (1901) (delivery by bank teller of gold pieces in the belief that they were
nickels), or b) the identity of the recipient. Rex v. Mucklow, 168 Eng. Rep. 1225
(1827) (postman delivered letter to the wrong "James Mucklow"); W. LaFave & A.
Scott, supra, § 85, at 629. If the recipient of the property transferred by mistake
appropriated the property knowing of the mistake at the time of delivery, he commits
a trespass in the taking and is guilty of larceny. Id. § 85, at 629; see United States v.
Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 1961) (delivery of goods by transferor acting
under unilateral mistake of fact may be ineffective to transfer right to possession or
title); Rex v. Mucklow, 168 Eng. Rep. 1225, 1226 (1827) (larceny conviction reversed
because defendant Mucklow had no animusfurandiwhen hefirst received misdelivered letter and check, which he subsequently cashed). A second view regarding
larceny by mistake distinguishes mistake in the factum from mistake in the inducement, and reasons that only when the mistake is as to the identity of the object given
to another does a misappropriation constitute common-law larceny. For example,
when A gives B a ten dollar bill, believing both that he owes B five dollars and that
the bill is in fact a five dollar bill, B is guilty of larceny if he knowingly accepts it. See
United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145, 1151-53 (D. Md. 1976) (explaining the
two viewpoints but concluding that because the distinction has been rejected by most
courts, either type of larceny by mistake is common-law larceny), aff'd mem., 551
F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977). See generally Beatty, The
Federal Bank Robbery Act: Has Fraud Become Larceny?, 86 Banking L.J. 195
(1969), which criticizes the reasoning of decisions construing § 2113(b) that were
based on theories of larceny by mistake and concludes that Congress intended to
adopt the technicalities of common-law distinctions in § 2113(b).
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interpretation of the amendment, however, includes other types of
theft9 that are not technically trespassory in nature. Such non-trespassory thefts include taking by false pretenses, whereby the owner,
influenced by fraud, intends to part with both title and possession,' 0
and embezzlement, whereby the wrongdoer already has lawful possession of the property." This disagreement has stemmed from the
9. See supra note 6.
10. Taking by false pretenses is a statutory crime, defined in slightly different
ways in various jurisdictions. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8, § 90, at 655. It
consists generally of the following elements: "(1) a false representation of a material
present or past fact (2) which causes the victim (3) to pass title to (4) his property to
the wrongdoer [or some third person at the wrongdoer's direction or request], (5)
who (a) knows his representation to be false and (b) intends thereby to defraud the
victim." Id.; accord United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 382 (10th Cir. 1982)
petitionfor cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); People v. Jones, 36 Cal. 2d
373, 377, 381, 224 P.2d 353, 355, 358 (1950); Black's Law Dictionary 541 (5th ed.
1979). "The representation may be implied from conduct, or may consist of concealment or non-disclosure where there is a duty to speak [and] may consist of any act,
word, symbol or token calculated and intended to deceive." Bright v. Sheriff, 90
Nev. 168, 170, 521 P.2d 371, 373 (1974) (per curiam) (emphasis deleted); Black's
Law Dictionary 541 (5th ed. 1979); accord W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8, §
90, at 656.
The owner's retention of title distinguishes larceny from taking by false pretenses.
See J. Miller, supra note 8, § 121, at 390. For example, in LeMasters v. United States,
378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967), the defendant fraudulently represented himself to a
federally insured bank as one of its depositors, Mr. Tournour, by presenting stolen
identification papers. He was issued a new passbook in Tournour's name and withdrew a total of $6700 from the account, without any authority from Tournour. Id.
at 263. The defendant's conduct was taking by false pretenses because the bank,
relying on defendant's false representations, had willingly given over title and possession of the money. See id. at 263-64. The court reversed the defendant's conviction,
holding that § 2113(b) covered only common-law larceny. See id. at 266-68.
11. Embezzlement is a statutory crime generally consisting of the following
elements: "(1) the fraudulent (2) conversion of (3) the property (4) of another (5) by
one who is already in lawful possession of it," W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8,
§ 89, at 644, or who has been entrusted with the property. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 469 n. 1 (1976). Most statutes list the various
types of persons who commit embezzlement when they fraudulently convert, such as
corporate directors and officers, attorneys, trustees, brokers and agents. W. LaFave
& A. Scott, supra note 8, § 84, at 621 n.10; id. § 89, at 644-45. A few jurisdictions
apply the statute to anyone who falls within its terms. Id. § 89, at 645. When the
wrongdoer converts the property lawfully in his possession to his own use, he does not
commit larceny because no trespass against the owner's right to possession has occurred. Id. § 89, at 644; J. Miller, supra note 8, § 116, at 374. A common example
of embezzlement occurs in an employer/employee situation. In Commonwealth v.
Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 30 N.E. 364 (1892), a store clerk momentarily placed cash
received from a customer into a cash drawer, and then converted the money to his
own use. Id. at 524, 30 N.E. at 364. The conviction for embezzlement was affirmed
because the court ruled that the employee had lawful possession of the money, which
he had not transferred to the employer at the time of conversion. Id. at 526, 30 N.E.
at 365. This situation is to be distinguished from a case in which the employer, and
not a third party, gives property to his employee. Because the employer retains
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unclear scope of the language of the 1937 amendment (section
2113(b)), which, in addition to section 2113(b), included a proscription of burglary. 12 Further, the legislative histories of the 1934 Act and
the 1937 amendment have sparked controversy1 3 because they are
sparse14 and provide little evidence of congressional intent.
Given this ambiguity, some courts have reasoned that both the rule
of lenity, which requires strict construction of ambiguous penal statutes,' 5 and the policy of judicial restraint in construing federal crimes
traditionally covered by state law,' 6 together dictate that section

"constructive possession" while the employee has mere custody, conversion by the
employee is still a trespass, and therefore larceny. Id. at 526, 30 N.E. at 364-65; W.
LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8, § 84, at 619 & n.4.
12. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 747, § 2(a), 50 Stat. 749 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976)) ("whoever shall enter or attempt to enter any bank, ...
with intent to commit. . . any felony or larceny, shall be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both"); see Jerome v. United States,
318 U.S. 101, 106 (1943).
13. Compare LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1967)
(Congress had no intention to include obtaining by false pretenses) with United States
v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1046-48 (3d Cir. 1982) (review of the legislative history
led to conclusion that Congress broadened the Act to include taking by false pretenses), petition for cert. filed sub noma. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S.
Aug. 7, 1982).
14. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105 (1942); United States v. Shoels,
685 F.2d 379, 382, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S.
Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1047 (3d Cir. 1982),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7,
1982).
15. Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3095 (1982); 3 C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 59.03, at 6-8 (4th ed. 1974) (citing
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931)); see Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81,
83-84 (1955). Cases of "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should
be resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
16. Some of the courts that narrowly construe § 2113(b) are concerned not with
the unquestioned jurisdiction of federal courts over federal offenses, 13 C. Wright, A.
Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3575, at 509 (1975) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3231 (1976)), but rather with whether taking by false pretenses is a federal
offense under § 2113(b). E.g., LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 263-64 (9th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Rollins, 383 F. Supp. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on
other grounds, 522 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
Because there is no federal criminal common law, federal criminal prosecutions must
rest on an Act of Congress specifically defining the crime. United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812). If a crime is not a federal offense, it is
necessarily left to the states' jurisdiction. See id. at 33. Courts supporting a narrow
interpretation of the section are reluctant to include taking by false pretenses because
Congress did not explicitly use the term in the statute, and it is already covered by
state law. E.g., LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Rollins, 383 F. Supp. 494, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other
grounds, 522,F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
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2113(b) be narrowly applied.' 7 Other courts reject this reasoning.
They hold that the section should be read broadly to include both
trespassory and non-trespassory offenses because of the strong federal
interest in protecting the federally insured funds of the numerous
banks and other financial institutions covered by the Act.' 8
This Note analyzes the statute within the framework of traditional
principles of statutory construction. It examines the language and the
legislative history of the statute and determines that neither requires
that application of section 2113(b) be limited to common-law larceny. ' The rule of lenity and the policy of judicial restraint regarding
federal criminal jurisdiction are then weighed against the general
purpose of the amendment and the federal interest in protecting the
assets of federally insured banks.20 This Note concludes that the purposes behind the amendment and this strong federal interest require
that common-law distinctions be rejected, and therefore, that section
2113(b) be broadly construed to encompass both trespassory and nontrespassory offenses.
I. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

OF

SECTION 2113(b)

Analysis of the language of the 1937 amendment is the first step in
determining its meaning. 21 The pertinent words describing the conduct punishable under section 2113(b) are: "[w]hoever takes and car17. E.g., United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981);
LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1967).
18. United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1982), petition
for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982); see
United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, No.
82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982).
19. See infra pts. I-II.
20. See infra pts. III-IV.
21. See 2A Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 46.01, at 48 (4th ed. 1973). Statutory
construction can be approached from two points of view. Some courts are concerned
with interpreting the statute according to the intent of the legislature; others attempt
to determine the meaning of the statute as the public would understand it. Id. §§
45.05, 45.07-08. The plain meaning rule examines the language of the statute, and if
the intent of the legislature is clear and unambiguous from that language, there will
be no room for construction. Id. §§ 46.02, 46.04. "[T]he plain meaning rule seems
most consistent with . . . an interpretation according to what the statute means, or
may be supposed to mean, to persons affected by it." Id. § 46.01, at 49. This inquiry
into the plain meaning of the statute, however, also takes into account the will of the
legislature because the text of the statute is seen as the best evidence of legislative
intent. Id. § 46.03, at 53. Penal laws, such as § 2113(b), are "given their common
and ordinary meaning so that they may be understood by all." 3 id. § 59.08, at 26;
People v. Shakun, 251 N.Y. 107, 114, 167 N.E. 187, 189-90 (1929) ("tools" does not
include printing equipment). As part of an amendatory act, the amendment must be
read as a whole, with words of common use construed in their "natural, plain and
ordinary meaning. If possible, effect must be given to every word." 1A Sutherland's,
supra note 15, § 22.29, at 177.
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ries away, with intent to steal or purloin. 2 2 Courts that interpret this
language as tantamount to a description of common-law larceny do so
because it closely resembles the various definitions given common-law
larceny. 23 Under this interpretation the statute does not apply to nontrespassory thefts, such as taking by false pretenses or embezzlement,
24
because these offenses did not constitute larceny at common law.
Common-law larceny, however, cannot be simply or uniformly defined, although its elements have traditionally been considered: 1) the
"felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another, 1 5 with 2) an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his
property. 26 To fall within the ambit of common-law larceny, a taking
must be trespassory in nature,2 7 that is, without the owner's consent. 28
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1976).
23. E.g., Bennett v. United States, 399 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1968); LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Posner,
408 F. Supp. 1145, 1150, 1153 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); see United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854 (9th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam); United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 710-11 (6th Cir.
1981); United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816
(1981); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v.
Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1941) (construing predecessor to § 2113(b), 12
U.S.C. § 588b). In contrast to the words of common-law larceny-"takes and carries
away"-the crime of false pretenses is often described in terms of "obtaining money
by false pretenses." See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1025 (1976); W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra
note 8, § 90, at 655; J. Miller, supra note 8, § 118, at 382.
24. United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam);
United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 709, 710 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 836-37 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981); Bennett v.
United States, 399 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1968); LeMasters v. United States, 378
F.2d 262, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 437 (4th
Cir. 1961); see United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 75-76 (3d Cir. 1941) (construing
predecessor to § 2113(b), 12 U.S.C. § 588b); United States v. Starr, 48 F. Supp. 910,
910-11 (S.D. Fla. 1943) (same); United States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596, 597 (N.D.
Ind. 1940) (same).
25. LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1967) (quoting 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *230); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 438 (4th
Cir. 1961) (same); accord United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 382 (10th Cir.
1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W.
(U.S. Oct. 8, 1982) (No. 82-5550);
United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1941); United States v. Posner, 408
F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977). See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8,
§§ 85-87.
26. United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 382-83 (10th Cir. 1982), petitionfor
cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853,
854 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); accordUnited States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 75 (3d
Cir. 1941); United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd
mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); see LeMasters v.
United States, 378 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1967). This intent element can be reconciled in the cases as an intent of the taker to appropriate the stolen property to a use
inconsistent with the property rights of the owner. United States v. Maloney, 607
F.2d 222, 227 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Pennsylvania Indem. Fire Corp. v. Aldridge,
117 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1941)).
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The words "take and carry away" in section 2113(b) are clearly
associated with common-law larceny, though they are also compatible with non-trespassory theft offenses. 29 Section 2113(b) fails to use
the term "trespassory" and adds the word "purloin," which was not
used in common-law definitions of larceny. 3 The absence of the word
"trespassory" is significant because the element of trespass distinguishes common-law larceny from other theft offenses. 31 Moreover,
the phrase "with intent to steal or purloin" is not included in most
definitions of common-law larceny. This suggests that section 2113(b)
has a broad application. 3 The33precise meaning of this phrase, however, requires further analysis.
When a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term without
otherwise defining it, the term is generally given its common-law
meaning. 34 The words "steal" or "stolen," however, have no accepted
common-law meaning. 35 In United States v. Turley, 36 relied upon by
27. United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 382 (10th Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert.
filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 548 (5th
Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 825201); Bennett v. United States, 399 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 75
(3d Cir. 1941); United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd
mem.,551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); see United States v.
Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 707 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833 (3d
Cir.), cert.'denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981); United States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596,
597 (N.D. Ind. 1940).
28. United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 382 (10th Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert.
filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854
(9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Bennett v. United States, 399 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.
1968); United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1941) (citing Regina v.
Ashwell, 16 Q.B.D. 190, 195 (1885)); United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145,
1150-51 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
837 (1977).
29. See supra note 6 for cases espousing a broad construction.
30. LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1967).
31. See United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145, 1150-51 (D. Md. 1976) (in
false pretenses, the owner intends to part with possession and title; once he consents
to the taking there can be no larceny), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8, § 85, at 622 & n.2
(in embezzlement, "the wrongdoer fraudulently converts property already properly
in his possession, he does not take it from anyone's possession and so cannot be guilty
of larceny"). See supra notes 10-11.
32. See United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d
1042, 1048 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States,
No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982).
33. 2A Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 45.02; see LeMasters v. United States, 378
F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1967).
34. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957); Thaggard v. United
States, 354 F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
35. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957).
36. 352 U.S. 407 (1957).
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many courts espousing a broad construction of section 2113(b) , 3 the
Supreme Court construed the meaning of "stolen" in an analagous
statutory context. The statute in question prohibited the transportation of a motor vehicle in interstate commerce "knowing [it] to have
been stolen." ' 38 In examining the history of "steal" or "stolen, '3 9 the
Court noted that the original connotation of the word implied stealth,
and that it later became a generic designation for dishonest acquisition. 40 It also relied in part on a definition of "steal" as "the criminal
taking of personal property either by larceny, embezzlement, or false
pretenses."' 4' The Court concluded that "steal" or "stolen," as they
have been used in common usage and in federal statutes, "do not have
a necessary common-law meaning coterminous with larceny and exclusive of other theft crimes."' 42 In addition, many courts have construed other federal statutes containing words such as "steal," "stolen"
or "intent to steal or purloin" as not limited to a technical, common43
law definition.

37. United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1045 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982); see,
e.g., United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petition for cert.
filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 737
(5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
38. 352 U.S. at 408. The issue in Turley was "whether the meaning of the word
'stolen,' as used in this provision, [National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2312 (1976)] is limited to a taking which amounts to common-law larceny, or
whether it includes an embezzlement or other felonious taking with intent to deprive
the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership." 352 U.S. at 408. A similar split
among the circuits regarding § 2312 had developed concerning the use of "stolen"
before it was resolved in Turley. Id. at 410-11.
39. 352 U.S. at 411-12.
40. Id. at 412 (quoting Boone v. United States, 235 F.2d 939, 940 (4th Cir.
1956)).
41. 352 U.S. at 412 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1583 (4th ed. 1951)); accord
United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1045 (3d Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert. filed
sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982). The Turley
Court looked to the definition of "stolen" in Webster's New International Dictionary
(2d ed. 1953), "[o]btained or accomplished by theft, stealth or craft." 352 U.S. at
412. It also noted that, "Blackstone does not mention 'steal' in defining larceny...
or in expounding its several elements." Id. (quoting Boone v. United States, 235 F.2d
939, 940 (4th Cir. 1956)).
42. 352 U.S. at 412. The Court held that "stolen" included "all felonious takings
. .. with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership,
regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny." Id. at 417.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 592 F.2d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1979)
(construing "steal" in 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976), which proscribes embezzlement, stealing, unlawful taking and carrying away of goods from interstate shipments); United
States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1978) (construing
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"stolen" in the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976), as "sufficiently broad to abolish archaic distinctions between larceny, . . . larceny by trick,
embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses"); United States v. Handler, 142 F.2d 351, 353 (2d Cir.) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 415 (1940)) (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976)), which prohibited interstate transportation of goods
"stolen, . . . taken feloniously. . . or with intent to steal or purloin"), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 741 (1944); Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1938) (construing 18
U.S.C. § 99 (1940)) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976)), "steal or purloin"
added to cover cases which "may shade into larceny, as well as any new situation...
not envisioned under the common law"); United States v. Trosper, 127 F. 476, 477
(S.D. Cal. 1904) (construing Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 336, § 281, Rev. Stat. § 5469,
43d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 1066 (1873-1874) (currently codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1976)) ("steal" from the mails not restricted to common-law larceny).
In United States v. Maloney, 607 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 918 (1980), the Ninth Circuit broadly interpreted the offense defined in 18
U.S.C. § 661 (1976)-"whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin,"-as
defining and punishing the crime of larceny within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1976). 607 F.2d at 226. It defined a federal crime of larceny, however, as not
limited to its common-law definition. Id. at 229. Previously, the Third Circuit in
United States v. Henry, 447 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1971), had broadly construed 18
U.S.C. § 661 (1976), tracing the history of this language as a federal crime to the Act
of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 16, 1 Stat. 112, 116, which was often referred to as
punishing "larceny." 447 F.2d at 284-85. The court held, however, that the words
" 'with intent to steal or purloin'. . . were intended to broaden the offense of larceny
to include such related offenses as would tend to complicate prosecutions under strict
pleading and practice." Id. at 285.
In an early case supporting the narrow construction of § 2113(b), United States
v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961), the Fourth Circuit also stated that the words
were "borrowed from the Act of April 30, 1790, which had been construed as a
larceny statute." Id. at 437. As demonstrated by the courts in Maloney and Henry,
however, the Act of April 30, 1790 and its subsequent enactments, retained the exact
same language, which is broader in scope than common-law larceny. United States
v. Maloney, 607 F.2d 222, 226-29 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980);
United States v. Henry, 447 F.2d 283, 285-86 (3d Cir. 1971).
That these same words, as used in § 2113(b), embrace only common-law offenses of larceny is a difficult argument to support. But see LeMasters v. United
States, 378 F.2d 262, 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1967) (§ 2113(b) does not cover false
pretenses but is language of common-law larceny). The Maloney court attempts to
distinguish the seemingly anomalous result in the LeMasters decision on the basis of a
"distinctly different" legislative history and purpose, but it affirms that the mere use
of the phrase "take and carry away," "classic larceny" to the court in LeMasters, does
not indicate a per se limitation to common-law larceny. United States v. Maloney,
607 F.2d 222, 229-30 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980). This
distinction is not well founded because the legislative history does not mandate a
limited reading, and the purpose of § 2113(b) supports a more liberal reading of the
statute. See United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petitionfor
cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d
1042, 1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United
States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982). Contra LeMasters v. United States, 378
F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1967); but see United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 91 &
n.1 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (construing "steals" in 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976) broadly
but distinguishing it from 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), which described common-law larceny); Loman v. United States, 243 F.2d 327, 329 (8th Cir. 1957) (construing
"stolen" in 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) narrowly as common-law larceny).
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The word "purloin" implies acts performed by stealth or trick 44 and
is defined as "to steal; to commit larceny or theft."' 45 "Theft," in turn,
is considered a "wider term than larceny," encompassing swindle and
embezzlement. 46 A broad interpretation of "steal or purloin" as used
in section 2113(b) is strongly supported by these definitions of "steal"
8 and the concluand "purloin, ' 47 their use in other federal statutes
49
Turley.
in
Court
sion reached by the Supreme
Courts favoring a narrow interpretation of section 2113(b), however, find that reliance on the Turley definition of "stolen" is inappropriate because the legislative purpose of the statute construed in Turley was different from that of section 2113(b). 50 Moreover, they
44. United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 678, 679 (8th Cir. 1978) (" 'purloin'...
is nearly synonymous with 'steal,' especially under circumstances that invoke a
breach of trust.").
45. Black's Law Dictionary 1400 (4th ed. 1957).
46. Id. at 1647-48.
47. United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1045-46 (3d Cir. 1982), petition
for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982);
United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 678, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1978); Thaggard v. United
States, 354 F.2d 735, 737-38 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
48. United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982) petitionfor cert.
filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Fistel, 460 F.2d 157, 162 (2d
Cir. 1972); see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 & n.9 (1957); United States
v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub non.
Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982).
49. United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 382-83 (10th Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d
1042, 1045, 1046 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United
States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982); United States v. Guiffre, 576 F.2d 126, 127
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d
678, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Fistel, 460 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1972);
Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 736-37 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 958 (1966); see United States v. Khamis, 674 F.2d 390, 394 (5th Cir. 1982). See
supra note 42.
50. United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 710 (6th Cir. 1981); LeMasters v.
United States, 378 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1967). The court in LeAlasters noted that
if the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act at issue in Turley had not been interpreted to
include obtaining a car by false pretenses, no jurisdiction would have had effective
control over the crime in situations in which the vehicle was taken across state
borders. Id. at 267. LeMasters argues that this provided a "powerful urge toward the
broad interpretation," which does not exist in the case of § 2113(b) because "state
law . . . was adequate and effectively enforced." Id. at 267-68. In fact, this same
argument does exist in the situation of § 2113(b) because money obtained by false
pretenses or embezzlement is just as easily carried across state borders, rendering
state law enforcement inadequate.
Although the legislative history of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act is
different, reliance on Turley for the proposition that "steal" or "stolen" do not
necessarily have a meaning restricted to common-law larceny in § 2113(b), e.g.,
United States v. Fistel, 460 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1972); Thaggard v. United States,
354 F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966), is proper
because it is not dependent upon Turley's subsequent analysis of the legislative
history.
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criticize the failure of some other courts to follow the precept in
Turley5' that language be interpreted "consistent[ly] with the context
in which it appears."'5 2 Thus, in order to resolve the ambiguity of
"take and carry away with intent to steal or purloin," the phrase must
be examined in 53
the context of the legislative history and the purpose
behind the Act.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

A. The 1934 Act
In 1934, the Senate passed a bill punishing certain offenses committed against federally insured banks. 54 The bill prohibited robbery, 55
burglary 56 and the taking and carrying away, or the attempt to take
and carry away, property or money or any thing of value "(1) without
the consent of such bank, or (2) with the consent of such bank obtained by the offender by any trick, artifice, fraud, or false or fraudulent representation, with intent to convert such property or money... 57
to the use of any individual, association ... other than such bank.
Clearly, this bill, had it remained in this form, would have prohibited
both common-law larceny and non-trespassory fraudulent takings.5 8
Yet without any discussion5 9 the House amended the bill, limiting it to
It should also be noted that the word "steal" as used in § 2113(b) is not part of
the criminal act itself, "takes and carries away," but part of the mental element,
"with intent to steal or purloin." In Turley, the broad construction of "stolen" and
the offense of "stealing" a motor vehicle to which it referred, related basically to the
criminal act, not the criminal intent. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 41417 (1956). It might be argued that this distinguishes the analysis in Turley from an
analysis of "steal" in § 2113(b). Memorandum, supra note 6, at 13.
51. United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 709-10 (6th Cir. 1981); see LeMasters
v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1967).
52. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412-13 (1957).
53. See United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 382-83 (10th Cir. 1982), petition
for cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d
1042, 1046-48 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United
States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982); 2A Sutherland's, supra note 15, §§ 45.02,
46.05, 47.03, 48.06, 48.08 (when words alone are ambiguous other sources such as
the legislative history, the social problem sought to be corrected, titles and headings,
and committee reports must be consulted in a search for a conclusive meaning or
intent of the statute as a whole).
54. S.2841, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong. Rec. 5738 (1934) (the banks included
were members of the Federal Reserve System or any bank "organized or operating
under the lavs of the United States").
55. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 103 (1943); see S. 2841, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., § 4(a), 78 Cong. Rec. 5738, 5738 (1934).
56. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 103 (1943); see S. 2841, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., § 3, 78 Cong. Rec. 5738, 5738 (1934).
57. S.2841, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., § 2, 78 Cong. Rec. 5738, 5738 (1934).
58. LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1967); see United
States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1046 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982).
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robbery alone.6 0 The amended bill was enacted 6' after consideration
of several others462 collectively known as the "crime" bills 6 3 or "antigangster" bills.
Congress' aim in enacting the 1934 Act was to aid state officials who
were hindered in apprehending "gangsters who operate[d] habitually
from one State to another in robbing banks" and escaped punishment
by traveling across state lines. 6 5 The elimination of the burglary,
larceny and fraudulent takings provisions was understandable 6 because at that time Congress was reluctant to intrude in matters
67
thought to be only of local significance.
B. The 1937 Amendment
The limitation of the 1934 Act to robbery permitted individuals
who stole money from federally insured banks, other than by the use
of force or violence, to escape federal prosecution.68 The bank, the
59. 78 Cong. Rec. 8767, 8776 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 8132 (1934) (following the
Conference Committee approval of the amended version of the bill passed by the
House). The Act also provided a higher penalty for any kidnapping or murder
committed in the course of a robbery. Federal Bank Robbery Act, ch. 304, § 3, 48
Stat. 783, 783 (1934).
60. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 103 (1943).
61. Federal Bank Robbery Act, ch. 304, 48 Stat. 783 (1934) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976)).
62. 78 Cong. Rec. 8044, 8044 (1934); (bills included: S. 2252 (Act to amend
prohibition against the transportation of kidnapped persons in interstate commerce);
S.2253 (Act making it unlawful for any person to flee from one state to another for
purpose of avoiding prosecution or the giving of testimony in certain cases); S.2575
(Act to define certain crimes against the United States in connection with the administration of federal penal and correctional institutions); S.2845 (Act to extend the
provisions of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act to other stolen property)).
63. 78 Cong. Rec. 8322, 8775 (1934).
64. Id. at 8768.
65. S.Rep. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1461, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); see Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 102 (1943);
United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1046 (3d Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert. filed
sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982); LeMasters v.
United States, 378 F.2d 262, 264-65 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1967).
66. LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1967).
67. See id. at 266; 78 Cong. Rec. 8133, 8133 (1934). When asked whether the bill
should also apply to other government institutions, Representative Sumners replied,
"We are going rather far in this bill, since all the property is owned, as a rule, by
the . . . community . . . . The committee was not willing to go further, and the
Attorney General did not ask it to.
...
Id. (statement of Rep. Sumners). Representative Sumners, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, may have been
responsible for the deletion of these provisions because he "sought throughout the
session to confine extensions of federal power to those situations where the need to
supplement state and local law enforcing agencies had become imperative." Note, A
Note On The Racketeering, Bank Robbery and "Kick-Back" Laws, 1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 445, 448-49 (1934); Memorandum, supra note 6, at 15 n.11.
68. See S. Rep. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937); H.R. Rep. No. 732,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937).
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ultimate beneficiary of the Act, was nonetheless injured as if it had
amendment was designed to avoid such
been robbed. 9 The 1937
70
"incongruous results."
Although little legislative history relating to this amendment exists, 71 courts that narrowly define section 2113(b) argue that Congress'
deletion of the language regarding non-trespassory fraudulent takings
from the final version of the 1934 Act, and its failure to reinsert such
language in the 1937 amendment, are evidence that Congress continued to refuse to classify such thefts as federal crimes. 72 According to
the Third Circuit in United States v. Simmons, 73 however, "it is just as
reasonable to conjecture that at that time Congress may have decided
that language expressly referring to fraud, artifice and false pretenses
of other criminal
in § 2113 might presage a narrow interpretation
74
statutes using the words 'steal or purloin."'
No firm conclusions can be drawn from this omission. Interestingly,
however, while the language deleted in 1934 of taking with consent
69. See S. Rep. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937); H.R. Rep. No. 732,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937).
70. See S. Rep. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937); H.R. Rep. No. 732,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). A letter of the Attorney General, which was made a
part of the House and Senate Reports, "explains the desirability of the proposed
amendment." S. Rep. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937); H.R. Rep. No. 732,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937). As an example of the "incongruous results," the
Attorney General noted that a man had been recently arrested in a national bank
while trying to walk out with $11,000, which he had taken during an employee's
momentary absence. The thief had not committed a robbery and as a result could not
be prosecuted under any federal statute. S. Rep. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1937); H.R. Rep. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937); see United States v.
Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S.
Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1047-48 (3d Cir. 1982),
petition for cert. filed sub noma. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7,
1982).
71. See supra note 14.
72. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1943); United States v.
Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 710-11 (6th Cir. 1981); Bennett v. United States, 399 F.2d 740,
742 (9th Cir. 1968); LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 437 & n.14 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v.
Rollins, 383 F. Supp. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on othergrounds, 522 F.2d 160
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); United States v. Mangus, 33 F.
Supp. 596, 597 (N.D. Ind. 1940) (construing predecessor of § 2113(b), 12 U.S.C.
§ 588b).
73. 679 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v.
United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982).
74. Id. at 1048. The court gave as an example 18 U.S.C. § 661, which contains
similar language and has been construed in United States v. Maloney, 607 F.2d 222,
231 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980), as not limited to offenses
amounting to common-law larceny. After a thorough analysis of the legislative
history of § 2113(b), 679 F.2d at 1046, the court rejected a narrow reading of the
legislative intent and interpreted the section to "encompass a scheme ... whereby
forged checks were utilized to remove funds from insured banks." Id. at 1049.
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obtained "by any trick, artifice, fraud, or false or fraudulent representation" 75 was not used in the 1937 amendment, neither was the language from the 1934 Act repeated which clearly expressed commonlaw larceny: "tak[ing] ... without the consent of [the] bank ... with
intent to convert... to the use of any individual ... other than [the]
bank."' 76 Nor did Congress use the exact wording of the burglary
provision deleted in 1934 when it added that offense in 1937. 7 7 The
mere inclusion in the 1937 amendment of the phrase "take and carry
away," words of "classic larceny, '17 does not necessarily indicate that
this phrase to be incompatible with non-trespasCongress understood
79
sory offenses.
Additionally, some courts give several other reasons to demonstrate
that Congress understood section 2113(b) to define common-law larceny, including: 1) the amendment was entitled, "An Act to amend
the bank-robbery statute to include burglary and larceny"; 0 2) the

75. S. 2841, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong. Rec. 8132 (1934).
76. Id.
77. Compare id. ("breaks into, or attempts to break into ... with intent to
commit . . . any offense defined by this act or any felony") with H.R. 5900, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., 81 Cong. Rec. 5376 (1937) ("whoever shall enter or attempt to enter
any bank . . . with intent to commit . . . any larceny or other depredation") and
Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 747, § 2(a), 50 Stat. 749 (1937) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976)) (same as H.R. 5900 except "with intent to commit . . . any
felony or larceny").
78. LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1967).
79. For example, in 1934 Congress employed the words "take and carry away" to
proscribe two types of theft offenses, "takings" both without consent of the bank or
with consent obtained by fraud. See supra note 57. The repetition of this phrase "take
and carry away" in the 1937 amendment similarly could indicate that Congress
understood this phrase not as limited to common-law larceny, but as compatible with
both consensual and non-consensual takings committed "with intent to steal or
purloin." Memorandum, supra note 6, at 16-17. In 1939, however, Congress passed a
statute that prohibited the obtaining of money by false pretenses on the high seas. Act
of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 434, 53 Stat. 1205 (currently codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1025
(1976)). The false pretense statute was passed to include "card sharping" offenses on
the high seas which were not covered by the statute prohibiting "larceny," presently
at 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1976). See S. Rep. No. 446, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939). This
"larceny" statute, § 661, contains exactly the same language as § 2113(b), "take and
carry away with intent to steal or purloin." This might suggest that in 1937 Congress
did not understand the words of § 2113(b) to include obtaining by false pretenses.
Memorandum, supra note 6, at 17-19 & n.14. A contrary conclusion may be drawn,
however, from decisions in the Ninth and Third Circuits that analyzed the history of
§ 661 and determined that "18 U.S.C. § 661 and its predecessor statutes were not
mere codifications of the common-law crime of larceny but were intended to
broaden that offense." United States v. Maloney, 607 F.2d 222, 229 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980); United States v. Henry, 447 F.2d 283, 285-86 (3d
Cir. 1971). For a further discussion of Maloney and Henry, see supra note 43.
80. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 747, 50 Stat. 749 (1937); see United States v.
Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 710 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 836
(3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981); LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d
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committee reports describe it in the same way; 8 ' and 3) a short floor
discussion of the House bill referred to it as "larceny. '18 2 In Jerome v.
United States,8 3 the Supreme Court, construing the word "felony" in
the burglary section 4of section 2113 also referred to section 2113(b) as
defining "larceny."

262, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 437 & n.13 (4th
Cir. 1961).
81. S. Rep. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937); H.R. Rep. No. 732, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937).
82. 81 Cong. Rec. 4656 (1937) (statement of Rep. Wolcott). This discussion does
not necessarily indicate that the language of § 2113(b) is limited to common-law
larceny because the meaning of "larceny" as used in the discussion is not clarified.
Id., see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 414-17 (1957). In Turley, the Court,
construing the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act noted that although the Congressional floor discussion referred to "larceny," this did not imply that Congress meant
common-law larceny because nothing was said about excluding other forms of theft.
The Court stated that "[n]o mention [was] made of a purpose to distinguish between
different forms of theft, as would be expected if the distinction had been intended."
Id. at 414-15. Congress modified § 2113(b) by dividing it into two offenses, a felony
and a misdemeanor, based solely on the value of the property or money stolen, 81
Cong. Rec. 5376-77 (1937), because it did not wish to impose the same penalties for
robbery, breaking and entering, and any other taking and carrying away. See id. at
4656 (statements of Reps. Rankin and Wolcott). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967), the leading case
espousing a narrow construction, noted that this division is precisely the distinction
between grand and petit larceny. Id. at 265; see Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S.
101, 103-04 (1943) (dictum). This division of the offense into a felony or misdemeanor bears no relevance to the determination of the scope of § 2113(b). Many
federal criminal statutes, which punish not only larceny but also embezzlement and
possession offenses, impose penalties according to the division betweer 'a felony and a
misdemeanor offense. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy) (1976); id. § 655 (embezzlement); id. § 656 (embezzlement); id. § 659 (possession); id. § 662 (same); id.
§ 1025 (false pretenses).
83. 318 U.S. 101 (1943).
84. Id. at 103-04, 106. The Court's statement that the 1937 amendment added
"two new clauses-one defining larceny," id. at 103, and that "Congress defined in
§ 2(a) robbery, burglary, and larceny but not felony," id. at 106, was dictum
because the actual holding concerned the scope of "felony" as used in the burglary
section. Id. at 108. In addition, the Court referred to the provision in the 1934 Act,
which prohibited takings both without consent of the bank and with consent obtained by fraud, as "dealing with larceny," id. at 103, although it clearly included
both common-law larceny and false pretenses. See supra note 58 and accompanying
text. Arguably, this indicates that the Court's reference to the 1937 amendment as
defining "larceny" does not refer exclusively to common-law larceny. See Memorandum, supra note 6, at 17.
It must be noted that in Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957), the
Supreme Court again had occasion to construe § 2113 in deciding "whether unlawful entry [§ 2113(a)] and robbery [§ 2113(a)] [were] two offenses consecutively punishable in a typical bank robbery situation." Id. at 324. The legislative history of the
1934 Act and the 1937 amendment were again examined and § 2113(b) was referred
to as "larceny." Id. at 325-26. The Court stated, however, that "larceny," as used in
the opinion, "refer[red] not to the common-law crimes, but rather to the analogous
offenses in the Bank Robbery Act." Id. at 324 n.2.
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Even if section 2113(b) does define "larceny," it does not necessarily
follow that this definition is limited to common-law larceny. 5 The
technical distinctions between common-law larceny and the non-trespassory offenses of false pretenses and embezzlement were criticized in
the 1930's,88 and a number of states had amended their theft statutes
to include all of these offenses under the label of "larceny." 7 Congress
did not mention the word "larceny" in section 2113(b)88 but chose the
broader phrase, "takes and carries away with intent to steal or purloin." 8 9 In light of these factors, Congress arguably used the label
"larceny" without intending to limit section 2113(b) to common-law
larceny.9 0
In assessing Congress' intent in the 1937 amendment, the Ninth
Circuit in LeMasters v. United States discerned no "background of
evil" that Congress sought to correct other than "the evil of interstate

85. When Congress uses a common-law term that it does define, its meaning
must be evaluated from the words used, 2A Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 46.01,
other federal statutes, see Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 108 n.6 (1943), and
the legislative history, see id. at 102-06, without assuming it is limited to its commonlaw definition. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (a common-law
term not defined by Congress will be assumed to carry its common-law meaning);
Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 108 n.6 (1943) (same); 3 Sutherland's, supra
note 15, § 59.08 (penal statutes subject to all rules of statutory construction).
86. Memorandum, supra note 6, at 9-10; see, e.g., J. Miller, supra note 8,
§ 115(b), at 373-74 & n.81 (quoting Comment, Larceny by Trick: FalsePretenses, 2
Calif. L. Rev. 334, 335 (1914) ("The boundary line separating [trespassory and nontrespassory theft offenses] is often too difficult to ascertain in advance," resulting in
technical pleadings which produce unnecessary acquitals. "[T]he subtle distinctions
in these crimes [are not] inherent in the nature of things, but ... their existence is
entirely due to accidental, historical causes, and their perpetuation is a disgrace.")).
87. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266, § 30 (1932); Mason's Minn. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 101, § 10358 (1927); Birdseye, Cumming & Gilbert's Consol. Laws of N.Y. Ann.,
vol. 5, ch. 88, § 1290 (1909); R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 39, ch. 397, §§ 15-16 (1923); Code
of Va. Ann. tit. 40, ch. 179, §§ 4451, 4459 (1919); Remington's Rev. Stat. of Wash.
tit. 14, ch. 9, § 2601 (1932); W. Va. Code, ch. 61, art. 3, §§ 21, 24 (1931); see
Memorandum, supra note 6, at 10.
88. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 747, 50 Stat. 749 (1937) (codified as amended in 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1976)).
89. United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert.
filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 747, § 2(a), 50 Stat.
749, 749 (1937) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1976)); see United
States v. Henry, 447 F.2d 283, 285-86 (3d Cir. 1971) (words "steal" and "purloin"
used in § 661 intended to broaden the offense beyond common-law larceny).
90. See United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1047-48 (3d Cir. 1982),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7,
1982); Memorandum, supra note 6, at 9-10, 16. But see Beatty, supra note 8, at 221
(Congress intended to adopt the technicalities distinguishing common-law larceny
from non-trespassory offenses in § 2113(b)); Note, Obtaining Money by False Pre-

tenses from a Bank Is Not a Violation of The Federal Bank Robbery Statute, 5
Houston L. Rev. 531, 535 (1968) (analyzing LeMasters and concluding that the strict
common-law definitions it adhered to best comported with Congressional policy).
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operation of gangster bank robbers." 9' Thus, the court concluded that
Congress could not have intended to include non-trespassory thefts
because they "have no aspects of interstate gangster activities. ' 92 This
conclusion is inexplicable. Although taking by false pretenses, for
example, does not embody the forceful or violent nature of gangster
bank robberies, neither do the trespassory offenses of burglary or
common-law larceny, which indisputably were included in the 1937
amendment. The LeMasters court failed to recognize that the amendment of the Act, "to include burglary and larceny," 93 "demonstrates
rethat Congress' concern had expanded beyond the 'gangsterism'
94
ferred to in the legislative history of the original 1934 Act."
Moreover, the inability to assert federal jurisdiction over those who
commit non-trespassory takings would produce the incongruous
results Congress intended to avoid.9 5 Absent further proof of legislative intent in 1937 or any limiting language on the face of the statute,
and in light of the purpose of the amendment, it must be concluded
that the expansion of the scope of the Act beyond robbery was not
burglary and those offenses that were larsolely intended to include
96
law.
common
ceny at
III. THE RULE OF LENITY
Courts supporting a narrow construction of section 2113(b) state
97
that such an interpretation is mandated by the rule of lenity, which
91. 378 F.2d at 267.
92. Id. at 266.
93. See supra note 80.
94. United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048 (3d Cir. 1982), petitionfor
cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982). A
broad construction of § 2113(b) in Simmons was further supported by the subsequent
amendments to § 2113, which "manifest[ed] a consistent attempt by Congress to
expand rather than restrict the scope of that provision." Id. at 1048; e.g., Act of June
29., 1940, ch. 455, 54 Stat. 695 (1940) (added offense of receiving, possessing or
concealing property or money knowing it to have been taken in violation of §
2113(b)); Act of Aug. 3, 1950, ch. 516, 64 Stat. 394 (1950) (amended to include
federally insured savings & loan associations); Act of Sept. 22, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86354, § 2, 73 Stat. 628, 639 (1959) (amended to include federal credit unions as
defined in the Federal Credit Union Act); Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-468,
§ 8, 84 Stat. 994, 1017 (1970) (to include any federally insured credit union).
95. See United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petitionfor
cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982).
96. Id.; United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1982),
petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7,
1982).
97. United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
816 (1981); see United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 710-11 (6th Cir. 1981);
LeMasters v. United States, 378 F. 2d 262, 268 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Starr, 48 F. Supp. 910, 911 (S.D. Fla. 1943) (construing predecessor to § 2113(b), 12
U.S.C. § 588b); United States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596, 597 (N.D. Ind. 1940)
(same).
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requires that ambiguities in penal statutes be strictly construed against
the government.9 A harsher alternative will be chosen only when
"Congress [has] spoken in language that is clear and definite." 99 Thus,
if the words of the statute "leave no reasonable doubt as to [their]
meaning or the intention of the legislature,"10 0 resort to the rule of
lenity is inappropriate.' 0 l
Arguably, section 2113(b) is unambiguous because non-trespassory
offenses such as taking by false pretenses and embezzlement also fall
within the literal terms of the section, 0 2 and the broad language
employed indicates that Congress intended to proscribe more than
common-law larceny. If the words of the statute are deemed ambiguous, however, the rule of lenity would still be inapplicable. One
reason for applying the rule is to ensure fairness by providing adequate warning "in language that people generally would understand,
as to what actions would expose them to ... penalties and what the
penalties would be."' 0 3 It would take a tortured reading of section
2113(b) to find that one who takes by false pretenses or embezzlement
had not been apprised of the wrongfulness of his act or that such an
act is punishable. When the function of fair "warning is assisted by
common knowledge and understanding of conventional values," as in
malum in se offenses like taking "with intent to steal or purloin," a
strict construction of the statute is less necessary. 0 4 Furthermore,
given that all types of theft are proscribed by state statutes, "it may be
unreal to argue that there are notice problems under the federal
law." 105
Another rationale underlying the rule's application is the prevention of "judicial usurpation of the legislative function [by enforcement
of] a penalty where the legislature had not clearly and unequivocally
proscribed it."' 1 6 Thus, some courts urge a narrow reading of this
98. 3 Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 5903, at 6-8.
99. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting United States v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952)); see Prince v. United
States, 352 U.S. 322, 329 (1957).
100. 3 Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 59.04, at 13; see United States v. Anderez,
661 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 1981).
101. United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1981); see Williams v.
United States, 102 S.Ct. 3088, 3095-96, 3101-02 (1982) (White and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
102. Memorandum, supra note 6. at 5.
103. 3 Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 59.03, at 7; accord McElroy v. United
States, 102 S.Ct. 1332, 1341 (1982); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971);
United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert. filed,
No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982).
104. 3 Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 59.03, at 8; see Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 355 (1964); People v. Shakun, 251 N.Y. 107, 114, 167 N.E. 187, 189
(1929); People v. Phyfe, 136 N.Y. 554, 559, 32 N.E. 978, 979 (1893).
105. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 n.15 (1971).
106. 3 Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 59.03 at 8; accord United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 348 (1971); United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1909).
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section reasoning that Congress did not "clearly and
unequivocally
10 7
proscribe" takings other than common-law larceny.
Limitations to the rule of lenity, 108 however, prevent a narrow
construction of section 2113(b). 10 9 The rule is "merely one among
various aids which may be useful in determining the meaning of penal
laws,"" 0 and it "should not be permitted to defeat the policy and
purposes of the statute." "I Even though the offense must be confined
to the words of the statute,1 2 the rule does not require "that every
criminal statute must be given [its] narrowest possible meaning"; "3
nor "should [the language] be read with[out] the saving grace of
common sense." 1 4 The rule "is satisfied if the words are given their
fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers." 15
Applying the rule of lenity to section 2113(b) thwarts the purpose of
the 1937 amendment, which was to protect federally insured banks by
expanding the category of proscribed takings beyond robbery to include those committed without the use of force or violence." 6 A
narrow interpretation of section 2113(b) encompasses the commonlaw offenses of larceny by trick" 7 and larceny by unilateral mistake of

107. See United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 710-11 (6th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 836 & n.7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981);
LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Starr, 48 F. Supp. 910, 911 (S.D. Fla. 1943) (construing predecessor to § 2113(b), 12
U.S.C. § 588b); United States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596, 597 (N.D. Ind. 1940)
(same).
108. See 3 Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 59.06 (for example, intent of the legislature, purpose and policy of the Act, evils which Congress sought to overcome).
109. See United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d
1042, 1048 (3d Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States,

No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982).
110. 3 Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 59.06, at 18 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. (footnote omitted); see McElroy v. United States, 102 S.Ct. 1332, 1339,
1341 (1982); United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1981).
112. 3 Sutherland's, supra note 15, § 59.04, at 14; id. § 59.06, at 18.
113. McElroy v. United States, 102 S.Ct. 1332, 1341 (1982) (quoting United
States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 510 (1955)); see 3 Sutherland's, supra note 15,
§ 59.06, at 18.
114. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); see 3 Sutherland's, supra note
15, § 59.06, at 19.
115. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26 (1948), quoted in Williams v. United
States, 102 S.Ct. 3088, 3101 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. See United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d
1042, 1047-48 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United

States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982). See supra pt. II(B).
117. See United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 678, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596, 597 (N.D. Ind. 1940) (construing predecessor to
§ 2113(b), 12 U.S.C. § 588b). See supra note 8 for a definition of larceny by trick.
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the owner (bank), 118 but excludes non-trespassory thefts such as taking
by false pretenses because they were not part of larceny at common
law.1 1 9 Distinctions between these forms of dishonest acquisition,
to [any] essential difference in the charhowever, fail to "correspond
20
acter of the acts."1
118. See supra note 8 for definition of larceny by unilateral mistake of the owner.
In United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), the defendant
took and recashed a check that the teller mistakenly left on the counter. Id. at 854. A
larceny conviction was upheld because the bank was deemed to retain constructive
possession. Id. In United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961), the teller
misread a paycheck in the amount of $97.92 by using the date as the amount to be
paid, $1206.59. Id. at 434. This constituted larceny by unilateral mistake, which was
larceny at common law, and therefore covered by § 2113(b). Id. at 438. In United
States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977), the defendant's spending of money erroneously deposited into his account by the bank was larceny by mistake, covered by
§ 2113(b). Id. at 1150-51.
119. United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam);
United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 708, 710-11 (6th Cir. 1981); LeMasters v.
United States, 378 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1967). In United States v. Patton, 120
F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1941), the defendant altered a check, forged a signature and
withdrew over $10,000. Id. at 74. The court held that this was not common-law
larceny because the bank intended to pass title and possession. Id. at 75-76. In
Bennett v. United States, 399 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1968), the defendant's conduct was
not covered by § 2113(b) because the bank's consent to defendant's taking money for
acting as an intermediary in procuring loans precluded the finding of a trespass. Id.
at 743-44. In United States v. Starr, 48 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Fla. 1943), the defendant
presented a forged check which the bank paid. The statute did not cover taking by
deceit or fraud. Id. at 910-11.
120. Fletcher, supra note 11, at 469-70 (quoting Van Vechten v. American Eagle
Fire Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 303, 306, 146 N.E. 432, 433 (1925) (Cardozo, J.)). The
essential character of an act of theft, whether it be larceny, embezzlement or taking
by false pretenses, is the wrongful deprivation of money, goods or property from the
owner or possessor of such property. The many technical differences existing between
these related theft offenses, however, can be explained in part by their historical
development. See generally Fletcher, supra note 11.
At common law, larceny encompassed only the trespassory taking of another's
property. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8, § 84, at 618. Early courts, in
determining the scope of larceny, apparently considered it a crime "designed to
prevent breaches of the peace." Id. Non-trespassory thefts, such as embezzlement or
false pretenses, evoked less "danger of an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 61819. The crime of common-law larceny did not include enticing a person to willingly
give up possession by means of fraud. Note, The Old Montana Dilemma and the New
Approach to Larceny by Trick and ObtainingGoods by FalsePretenses, 35 Mont. L.
Rev. 161, 162 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Montana Dilemma]. Courts responded to
this inadequacy not by eliminating the requirement of a trespassory taking but by
devising a legal fiction called "constructive possession." This allowed a finding of
trespass in "situations where in reality it is most difficult to find any trespass." W.
LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 5, § 84, at 619-20; accordMontana Dilemma, supra,
at 162. Thus, larceny by trick evolved, using "constructive possession" in order to
punish the wrongdoer who obtained possession but not title to property by defrauding the owner. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8, § 84, at 620. See supra note 8.
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That such technical distinctions based upon title versus possession
22
no longer prove helpful' 2' and would produce anomalous results,'
23
especially when the thefts involve money,' is illustrated by the following example. In a recent case, 124 the defendant requested a bank
teller to provide a $100 bill in exchange for four twenty-dollar bills
and two ten-dollar bills. The defendant then "palmed" the $100 bill
for a ten-dollar bill, asserted that the teller had erred, and thereby
received another $100 bill.' 25 This action apparently fits within the
If, however, a wrongdoer induced an owner to part with both possession and title
by means of false representations, he could not be convicted of larceny. The common
law sharply distinguished between the interests of possession of property and title.
Montana Dilemma, supra, at 161-62. If title was voluntarily passed to a wrongdoer,
he could not be convicted of larceny or larceny by trick, which were only crimes
against possession. Regardless of the scheme used to acquire title, the wrongdoer was
not viewed as a trespassor against property to which he now held title. Id. at 162.
Nor did common-law larceny cover the situation in which a person entrusted with
property misappropriates it, such as a bank teller who receives money from a depositor but does not record it as held by the bank. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8,
§ 84, at 620-21. Courts refused to extend the device of "constructive possession" to
these situations. Consequently, the new crimes of embezzlement and false pretenses
were statutorily created to punish such takings, although less severely than for crimes
of larceny. See Montana Dilemma, supra, at 162-63. The first false pretenses statute,
30 Geo. 2, c.24 (1757), was passed by Parliament in 1757. See W. LaFave & A. Scott,
supra note 8, § 84, at 621. An earlier statute, 33 Hen. VII, c.1 (1541), "made it a
crime to obtain property by means of something more tangible than spoken lies, a
'false Token or counterfeit Letter made in any other Man's Name,' being required."
Id. at 621 n.11. "The generative English embezzlement statute, 39 Geo. 3, c.85
(1799), was limited to servants and clerks who having 'receive[d] or take[n] into
possession' an itemized list of chattels, 'fraudulently embezzle, secret or make away
with the same.' " Fletcher, supra note 11, at 469-70 n.1.
Thus, a gap in the law still existed. A thief who was clever enough to obtain both
title and possession by a false promise could not be convicted under any theory. He
was not guilty of any form of common-law larceny because no trespass occurs when
title is willingly given away. Nor was he guilty of taking by false pretenses because
that crime only included takings by a false representation of a past or present fact,

and not takings induced by a false promise. Montana Dilemma, supra, at 163-64.
The courts' refusal to expand larceny and the use of "constructive possession" to
include non-trespassory takings, may be explained by "a revulsion against capital
punishment which was the penalty for all except petty larceny during much of the
18th century. [Its] savagery... not only would cause a judge to hesitate to enlarge
felonious larceny, but is sufficient to account for the host of artificial limitations ...
engrafted on that crime." W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8, § 84, at 621 (quoting
Model Penal Code, art. 206, appendix A, at 102 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1952); see
United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1941).
121. United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 382, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petitionfor
cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); see United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73,
76 (3d Cir. 1941); Montana Dilemma, supra note 120, at 164, 167-68.
122. Memorandum, supra note 6, at 8-9.
123. Montana Dilemma, supra note 120, at 164; see W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra
note 8, § 90, at 663-65.
124. United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1978).
125. Id. at 679.
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definition of taking by false pretenses; the defendant induced the
teller to part with possession and title by means of his false representation. Had the court found that the defendant's actions constituted
taking by false pretenses, the defendant could not have been convicted
under a narrow definition of section 2113(b). The court, however,
labeled his action larceny by trick, 12 6 which was part of common-law
larceny, and therefore included it under a strict interpretation of
section 2113(b).
In larceny by trick, the artificial legal device of "constructive possession" is used to find the necessary trespassory element.127 Although
the teller voluntarily relinquished actual possession, the bank retained
"constructive possession" because the defendant's lie negated the
bank's true intent to part with possession. Arguably, the court was in
error because the teller intended to pass both title and possession, in
which case the theft could not have been larceny by trick, but rather it
would have been taking by false pretenses. 28 An assertion that the
bank intended to retain title in such a transaction is implausible; the
bank hardly expected the same coins or bills to be returned. 2
The "maze of arbitrary distinctions" and the technical rules used to
distinguish these offenses have been subject to heavy criticism by
"[v]irtually all the academic writing in the field,"130 including commentary contemporaneous with Congress' enactment of the amendment. 131 Striving for consistency, the penal laws of most states and the
Model Penal Code have abrogated these differences by creating a
unified law of theft offenses. 132 Nevertheless, courts favoring a narrow
construction perpetuate the archaic and long-discredited distinctions
found at common law, 133 thereby obstructing the statute's policy of
126. Id. at 680.
127. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 8, § 84, at 619-20; see United States v.
Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). See supra note 120.
128. See United States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596, 597 (N.D. Ind. 1940).
129. See United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145, 1151 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd
mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); Montana Dilemma, supra note 120, at 164.
130. Fletcher, supra note 11, at 469-70 & n.4. But see Beatty, supra note 8, at 221
(arguing that Congress intended to preserve these distinctions in § 2113(b)).
131. See supra note 86.
132. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 470-72; Model Penal Code § 223.1 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962). Many states have consolidated the offenses of larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses into one statute proscribing "theft" or "larceny." E.g.,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1802 (1956 and Supp. 1982-1983); Cal. Penal Code
§§ 484, 490a (West 1970 & Supp. 1982); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-119 (West
1958 & Supp. 1982); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 943.20 (West 1982). See supra note 87.
133. See United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam);
United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 710-11 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pinto,
646 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981); Bennett v. United
States, 399 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 75-76
(3d Cir. 1941) (construing predecessor to § 2113(b), 12 U.S.C. § 588b); United States
v. Starr, 48 F. Supp. 910, 911 (S.D. Fla. 1943) (same).
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protecting federally insured banks. 134 The end result of a theft,
whether or not it constitutes common-law larceny, is the same: The
defendant has wrongfully obtained money to the bank's detriment. 1 35
A narrow interpretation based upon technical refinements of common-law larceny is also contrary to common sense because "[p]rofessional thieves resort to innumerable forms of theft and Congress presumably sought to meet the need for federal action effectively rather
than to leave loopholes for wholesale evasion." 136 Application of the
rule of lenity creates such a "loophole" because the non-trespassory
offenses of taking by false pretenses and embezzlement might not be
punishable under any other federal statute.1 37 The statute was designed to protect banks against the very risk of loss created by such
thefts; 1 38 therefore, non-trespassory offenses should also be included
within section 2113(b).

134. See United States v. Marrale, No. 82-1182, slip op. at 726-27 (2d Cir. Dec.
13, 1982); United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. filed, No. 82-5550 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1982); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d
1042, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United
States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982); Way v. United States, 268 F.2d 785, 786
(10th Cir. 1959).
135. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 416-17 (1957) (construing "stolen"
in 18 U.S.C. § 2312 as not limited to common-law larceny; an automobile is no less
"stolen" because it is embezzled or obtained by false pretenses).
136. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 416-17 (1957); see McElroy v. United
States, 102 S. Ct. 1332, 1339 (1982) (broadly construing 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976),
holding a forged instrument need not be proven forged before it crossed state lines,
otherwise a "patient forger [could] evade the reach of federal law" ); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 271 (1952) (dictum) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976),
stating "[w]hat has concerned codifiers of the larceny-type offense is that gaps or
crevices have separated particular crimes of this general class and guilty men have
escaped through the breaches [in] cases drawing fine distinctions between slightly
different circumstances").
137. A criminal may escape federal prosecution because, although embezzlement
from a federally insured bank, for example, is punished by 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976), it
applies only to bank officers and employees. Taking by false pretenses is punished by
18 U.S.C. § 1025 (1976), but only if it is committed upon the high seas or within an
area of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Unless the criminal commits other offenses
covered by Title 18 in furtherance of a scheme to defraud the bank, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1976) (requires conspiracy); id. § 1014 (1976) (prohibits false representations
in connection with loan applications); id. §§ 1341-1342 (1976) (mail fraud); id.
§ 2314 (1976) (prohibits transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of forged
checks, stolen money or goods), he cannot be prosecuted under federal law. See
Memorandum, supra note 6, at 9 & n.7 (narrow construction leaves a "gap of
uncertain dimensions in federal protection for federally insured institutions").
138. See Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3102-03 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (majority's application of the rule of lenity to exclude check-kiting
schemes from ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976) was misguided because conduct fit
within literal terms of statute, which was intended "to protect against the very risk
created by such conduct").
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IV. POLICY OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
REGARDING FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Another argument advanced in favor of a limited interpretation of
section 2113(b) is the policy of judicial restraint regarding congressional intent when construing statutes that affect the relationship between federal and state criminal jurisdiction. 13 The Supreme Court
discussed this policy in Jerome v. United States,140 in which it stated
that because "the administration of criminal justice under our federal
system has rested with the states, except as criminal offenses have been
explicitly proscribed by Congress ... where [such] offenses ... duplicate ... state law, courts should be reluctant to expand the defined
offenses beyond the clear requirements . . . of the statute."' 1 41 This
policy of judicial restraint was adopted by the court in LeMasters,142
which saw no reason why Congress "should have wanted to enter the
field of obtaining by false pretenses, duplicating state law which was
adequate and effectively enforced, and the duplication of which
would bring innumerable cases, most of them small, within the jurisdiction of federal prosecutors and courts."' 43 The court stated that
"such an extension of federal law would serve no purpose except to
confuse and dilute state responsibility for local crimes which were
being adequately dealt with by state law."'44
These claims concerning the inclusion of non-trespassory offenses
within section 2113(b)' 45 are unpersuasive. A narrow construction
139. See Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3093, 3095 (1982); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971). See supra note 16. The Court in
Williams, in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976) did not encompass a check-kiting
scheme, considered the fact that fraudulent checking activities were already addressed by state law and that the subject matter was traditionally regulated by the
states. 102 S. Ct. at 3093, 3095. In Bass, a second principle which supported the
narrow construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1) (1976), was the traditional reluctance
of Congress to define as a federal crime conduct denounced as criminal by the states.
The Court noted the corresponding hesitancy of the courts to assume, absent clear
language and intent, that Congress meant to significantly change the "sensitive
relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction." 404 U.S. at 349-50.
140. 318 U.S. 101 (1943).
141. Id. at 104-05.
142. LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 268 (9th Cir. 1967). Several other
courts have also relied on this policy to support a narrow construction. E.g., United
States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981);
Bennett v. United States, 399 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1968).
143. 378 F.2d at 268.
144. Id.
145. See id.; United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971) (Court rejected broad
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), which would render "traditionally local criminal conduct a matter for federal enforcement"); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S.
407, 418 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in the absence of express congressional
direction, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 should be construed narrowly to prevent a flood of minor
offenses that are local in nature in federal courts).
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based upon these arguments assumes that state law regarding nontrespassory offenses is both adequate and enforced.146 Under this interpretation of the statute, only burglary and common-law larceny were
made federal crimes by the 1937 amendment. 147 Yet these two crimes
already were covered by state law. 14 Thus, Congress duplicated state
laws, presumably because it deemed them inadequate to deal with
burglary and larceny from federal banks. 149 When interstate schemes
are involved, state laws regarding non-trespassory thefts may also be
inadequate. 5 0 Arguably, Congress intended to include both types of
theft in section 2113(b). Furthermore, the danger of diluting state
responsibility for local crimes is not present when the financial institutions involved are federally insured; trespassory or non-trespassory
thefts committed against them may no longer be purely local in
nature.'-"
The concern that innumerable small cases will deplete federal resources, see
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971); LeMasters v. United States, 378
F.2d 262, 268 (9th Cir. 1967), is questionable. The Justice Department has discretion
as to the offenses it chooses to prosecute as federal crimes. Therefore, any theft
offense, trespassory or non-trespassory, which involves a small amount of money
need not deplete valuable federal resources but may be left to state enforcement
agencies.
Arguably, broad construction of § 2113(b) would not create a flood of cases unlike
the result in other statutes. See Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3093, 3095
(1982) (check-kiting not included in 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976) to avoid flood of cases).
The inclusion of taking by false pretenses will not make a "broad range of [otherwise]
unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law," id. at 3093 (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1014 (1976)), because of the mens rea element, "with intent to steal or purloin." 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1976).
146. Bennett v. United States, 399 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1968); LeMasters v.
United States, 378 F.2d 262, 268 (9th Cir. 1967).
147. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 103, 106 (1943) (dictum); United
States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Bennett v. United
States, 399 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1968); LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262,
266 (9th Cir. 1967).
148. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 413 (1957) ("By 1919, the law of most
States against local theft had developed so as to include not only common-law
larceny but embezzlement, false pretenses, larceny by trick, and other types of
wrongful taking."); see, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266, §§ 14-15 (1932) (burglary);
Remington's Rev. Stat. of Wash. tit. 14, ch. 9, §§ 2578-2579 (1932) (burglary). See
supra note 87 for consolidated larceny statutes.
149. See S. Rep. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937); H.R. Rep. No. 732,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937).
150. See McElroy v. United States, 102 S.Ct. 1332, 1339 (1982); United States v.
Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom.
Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982).
151. See United States v. Bailes, 120 F. Supp. 614, 637 (S.D.W. Va. 1954) ("The
enforcement of the general criminal laws is a local matter [and] [f]ederal courts have
no jurisdiction over ordinary acts of violence, because such acts are offenses only
against the State and are not offenses against the Federal Government."). The
inclusion of non-trespassory offenses would not interfere with or dilute the authority
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Congress' broadening of the Federal Bank Robbery Act "to include
burglary and larceny" indicates a more comprehensive purpose than
its concern in 1934 of stopping interstate gangster bank robberies.152
By its 1937 legislation, Congress sought to further the federal interest
in protecting the assets of federally insured banks. 53 This interest
applies equally to protecting banks from non-trespassory offenses of
taking by false pretenses and embezzlement as to protection from
burglary and the trespassory offenses of common-law larceny. 154 Some
courts voice concern, however, that the policy of judicial restraint will
be violated by an expansion of federal jurisdiction in section 2113(b)
when Congress has not more explicitly proscribed non-trespassory
thefts.1 55 The paramount federal interest in protecting federally inof the states to regulate these criminal activities because States may prosecute under
their own criminal statutes. See Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3102 &
n.5 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall found "completely unjustified"
the majority's "attempt to buttress its decision" to exclude check-kiting from the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976) with the argument that federal enforcement might
interfere with traditional State regulation of this area. 102 S. Ct. at 3102. He noted
that inclusion of check-kiting would not "displace the authority of the States," but
rather it would "[complement] state law in an area where the federal interest is
substantial." Id. at 3102 n.5 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 n.9
(1981) (the RICO statute does not interfere with the police powers of the states to
define and prosecute crimes, and it is no restriction of "the separate administration of
criminal justice by the States" if some of these crimes are also violations of federal
law).
152. United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982).
153. See Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3097, 3102 & n.5 (1982)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("In Title 18, Congress has provided comprehensive criminal sanctions to protect federally insured institutions."); United States v. Marrale,
No. 82-1182, slip op. at 726-27 (2d Cir. Dec. 13, 1982) (purpose of Act is to protect
the banks in which the federal government has an interest); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048 (3d Cir. 1982) (Congress' concern directed to federal
government's potential obligation as an insurer to reimburse various financial institutions), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S.
Aug. 7, 1982); Way v. United States, 268 F.2d 785, 786 (10th Cir. 1959) (purpose of
Act is "to protect and safeguard the financial stability of the Federal Reserve Bank
System and the members thereof"). See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
154. See Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3097 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (check-kiting threatened assets of federally insured banks "in precisely the
same way as a misrepresentation in a loan application" and "should not be excluded
...simply because the terms of the statute and its legislative history [did] not
specifically identify check-kiting by name"); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d
1042, 1048 (3d Cir. 1982) (statute broadly construed due, in part, to federal interest
in protecting insured banks), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United
States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982); Way v. United States, 268 F.2d 785, 786
(10th Cir. 1959) (§ 2113(b) violated regardless of whether funds stolen were bank's
assets or from deposits therein).
155. United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
816 (1981); Bennett v. United States, 399 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1968); LeMasters v.
United States, 378 F.2d 262, 268 (9th Cir. 1967).
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sured banks negates this concern. 56 The federal government has a
strong interest in permitting its prosecutors to come to the aid of states
in combatting crime affecting it,15 7 whatever label is attached to the
theft.158 This is especially true when non-trespassory takings may
involve larger sums of money than cases of common-law larceny.',5 9
CONCLUSION

The strong federal interest in protecting federally insured banks
mandates a broad construction of section 2113(b) to include both
trespassory and non-trespassory takings. The statute's language and
legislative history, viewed in the light of this compelling interest,
outweigh considerations of the rule of lenity and the policy of judicial
restraint regarding federal criminal jurisdiction. In 1937, Congress
sought to further the protections afforded federally insured banks. It
did not intend to compromise the scope of this protection based upon
hypertechnical distinctions among thefts at common law.
Jeanne F. Philips

156. See Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3102 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1982),
petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7,
1982).
157. See Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3102 & n.5 (1982) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); McElroy v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 1332, 1339, 1341 (1982); United
States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert. filed sub
nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982).
158. See United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1982),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States, No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7,
1982).
159. Compare United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1044 (3d Cir. 1982)
(forged check scheme making profits of up to $7000 per week covered by broad
construction of § 2113(b)), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Brown v. United States,
No. 82-5201 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1982) and United States v. Fistel, 460 F.2d 157, 159 & n.2
(2d Cir. 1972) (scheme involving embezzlement of $1,700,000 in treasury bills covered by broad construction) with United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (conviction upheld under § 2113(b) for common-law larceny of
$2000) and United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 678, 679 (8th Cir. 1978) (conviction
under § 2113(b) for larceny by trick of $90). But see United States v. Posner, 408 F.
Supp. 1145 (D. Md. 1976) (conviction under narrow construction, larceny by mistake of $183,000), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837
(1977).

